Well, not so much the concept as much as how Spinoza addresses it in his final chapter of the Theological-Political Treatise. That's right! Finished the book. Now on to Seneca's Dialogues and Essays, before the next shipment of books comes in.
Chapter XX is on free speech and thought, and how it is necessary to a state. Much of the chapter is Machiavellian in nature. Sovereigns have the right to oppress and govern their people however they see fit, but practically this is unworkable. If even Moses had his detractors, it is clear that every sovereign will have theirs, no matter how pure or just. He approaches the subject other ways as well. For one, even if you can control man's speech, you can never control his thoughts. Though I suppose he never saw the modern communist state. And that free speech and thought contribute to advances in science. Finally, the oppression that may currently be in favor of a person can suddenly turn against them. These are all true statements, but my issue is this: he doesn't start from a priori values. Of course advances in science, political stability, and personal freedom are good things. Or, are they? I would venture that billions of people would disagree not only with Spinoza's method or conclusions, but even his base assumptions. I agree that all three of those things are desirous (well, put me down for half on personal freedoms), but the case needs to be made more clearly.
I found it interesting that he writes no man may wholly transfer his disposition to another, even in theory. You may submit to a contract, but never abdicate your right to think. I suppose this seems straightforward. In his next paragraph, however, he states that it is accepted that men's minds may be so controlled by another's that it could be said to be not his own. I don't see how those two statements can be mutually correct. With sufficient persuasive power over another, rendered more easy by years of indoctrination, I don't see how it could be said that that person retains their mental freedom. I would argue that a truly indoctrinated North Korean, or Soviet, or Chinese party official has lost their freedom of speech, in that they have been rigidly directed towards a beneficial (to the government) outcome.
But if this argument can be said, are we not all perhaps 'slaves' to others? I don't think anyone would argue that we are shaped by our environment. But to what extent does shaping become enslaving? If there is even one mental state that I may no longer experience due to the influence of those around me, am I any less enslaved than a North Korean? How can we measure the magnitude of lost thoughts and experiences?
Even more chilling: is a truly free thinker possible? Is such a man desirable? Could he be virtuous, or perhaps could he be evil?
Chapter XX is on free speech and thought, and how it is necessary to a state. Much of the chapter is Machiavellian in nature. Sovereigns have the right to oppress and govern their people however they see fit, but practically this is unworkable. If even Moses had his detractors, it is clear that every sovereign will have theirs, no matter how pure or just. He approaches the subject other ways as well. For one, even if you can control man's speech, you can never control his thoughts. Though I suppose he never saw the modern communist state. And that free speech and thought contribute to advances in science. Finally, the oppression that may currently be in favor of a person can suddenly turn against them. These are all true statements, but my issue is this: he doesn't start from a priori values. Of course advances in science, political stability, and personal freedom are good things. Or, are they? I would venture that billions of people would disagree not only with Spinoza's method or conclusions, but even his base assumptions. I agree that all three of those things are desirous (well, put me down for half on personal freedoms), but the case needs to be made more clearly.
I found it interesting that he writes no man may wholly transfer his disposition to another, even in theory. You may submit to a contract, but never abdicate your right to think. I suppose this seems straightforward. In his next paragraph, however, he states that it is accepted that men's minds may be so controlled by another's that it could be said to be not his own. I don't see how those two statements can be mutually correct. With sufficient persuasive power over another, rendered more easy by years of indoctrination, I don't see how it could be said that that person retains their mental freedom. I would argue that a truly indoctrinated North Korean, or Soviet, or Chinese party official has lost their freedom of speech, in that they have been rigidly directed towards a beneficial (to the government) outcome.
But if this argument can be said, are we not all perhaps 'slaves' to others? I don't think anyone would argue that we are shaped by our environment. But to what extent does shaping become enslaving? If there is even one mental state that I may no longer experience due to the influence of those around me, am I any less enslaved than a North Korean? How can we measure the magnitude of lost thoughts and experiences?
Even more chilling: is a truly free thinker possible? Is such a man desirable? Could he be virtuous, or perhaps could he be evil?
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