On Redundancy and Determinism

Sextus Empiricus claims that arguments are invalid if they are redundant. The example he uses, the premise 'if it is day, it is light' is such a redundancy, though I will overlook my disagreement with even that basic premise. Such a premise, in which the conditions follows directly and obviously from the antecedent, is 'invalid'. This backs Stoic logic into a corner, in my view. Empiricus admits this. If a premise is true, then the conditional can be directly deduced, and so it is invalid. If, on the other hand, the premise is false, than it will certainly be invalid as well. How then, can arguments proceed?

The prevailing attitude of the Stoics towards Sophist arguments was to ignore them. Arguments like the Sorites argument, or Little-by-Little argument. A good example is asking how many grains of corn make a heap of corn. By increasing the number of grains one by one, the addressee must eventually choose a number of grains which makes a heap of grain a heap - however, having picked a number, if that amount of grains is reduced by one then the heap should no longer exist. This is a thought-provoking argument, if rather useless, but the Stoics tend to minimize and ostracize the Sophists. It seems to me such an argument is good food for thought and a good mental exercise, and shouldn't be rejected out of hand.

Diodorus and Chrysippus were also engaged in a long argument, essentially about whether a thing can be possible if it never occurs. I think this is fascinating. If something doesn't occur, was it ever really possible? Likewise, if something occurs, was it not a necessity? For an example, I reach to my own history. Was it ever possible for me to attend Harvard? Conventionally, I would say yes. I have enough raw intelligence that I could have exerted myself sufficiently to be accepted there. In a sense, that future was possible. But in a more literal sense, it was never a possibility. As events in my life have borne out, I was not interested in academics until high school. Even then I came nowhere close to exerting myself. In that sense, then, attending Harvard was never a possibility. Sure, qualifying circumstances would change the truth of that statement - IF my past was different, THEN I could have attended. But that restructures the proposition. As Chrysippus noted, however, this outlook tends to remove moral responsibility from the actor. Let's say I cheated on a test in high school, which I did more than once. Sure, I accept responsibility for that. But on the other hand, the confluence of academic pressure, peer pressure, and the course of events to that point made my actions a necessity. To not cheat was possible, but never a possibility. 


Yet, the Stoics anguished over holding on to moral responsibility in the face of this argument. I cannot reject such responsibility, even though I agree with the conflicting theory of relative determinism. Obviously, I don't claim the two are compatible.

Chrysippus' argument: "If there is motion without cause, not every proposition will be either true or false, since anything lacking efficient causes will be neither true nor false. But every proposition is either true or false. Therefore there is no motion without a cause. If this is so, everything that happens happens through antecedent causes - in which case, everything happens through fate. The result is that everything that happens happens through fate."

On Dialectic

I was somewhat surprised to learn of the emphasis Stoics placed on dialectic and rhetoric. I had thought even dialectic was relatively unimportant to them, to say nothing of rhetoric. Yet, Diogenes Laertius claims early Stoics valued them both, and texts by Zeno, Chrysippus, and Epictetus partially support this notion. I was quite pleased then, since I recognize the value of dialectic, to see the Stoics attached several virtues to the science of logic and discourse. Non-precipitancy, uncarelessness, irrefutability, and non-randomness.

Zeno of Citium valued both divisions of logic. Dialectic was 'the closed fist' - clarity and brevity. Rhetoric was 'the outstretched hand' - breadth of argument and ability. Chrysippus, naturally, valued them both as well. It seems later Stoics eased off on their support for rhetoric. Certainly it is a useful skill to have, but not essential. Dialectic, however, as far as it comprises definitions and logical analysis is of great necessity to even an amateur philosopher.

I'll end with a strange view on arguments by Zeno. When told not to pass judgement until both sides had spoken, Zeno replied, "The second speaker must not be heard, whether the first speaker proved his case (for the inquiry is then finished) or did not prove it (for that is just like his not having complied when summoned, or his having complied by talking nonsense). But either he proved his case or he did not prove it. Therefore the second speaker must not be heard." I can honestly say I have never heard this take on discourse before, but perhaps there is something to it.

On Certainty 3

I finished Kant's Introduction to Logic tonight, though I won't have finished the book until I finish the essay on formal logic at the end. The book itself was only a posthumous compendium of his lecture notes; I suppose 'what makes a book' is a valid question. Anyway, I was intrigued by his discussion of the three levels of certainty, so to speak.

Opinion is objectively and subjectively inadequate, belief is objectively inadequate but subjectively adequate, and knowledge is both objectively and subjectively adequate. I don't precisely know what Kant means by 'adequate', though I think I understand his meaning. What I disagree with can be quickly summarized by the following quote: "Philosophical truths, however, which are rational, cannot be matters of belief at all; they must simply be known; for philosophy does not admit of any mere persuasion." The bigger issue here might be that I am still unsold on anything being known a priori. If such knowledge is possible, I am not sure it would extend beyond mathematics - I do not know how it could extend to philosophy. As Kant surely knows, what the ancient philosophers expounded was philosophy as well, but they contradicted each other - surely not everyone can be right. Hence, objective inadequacy of (some) philosophy. If he means to say that true philosophy can only be reasoned, and that not all 'philosophy' is really philosophy, then he should be a bit more clear on his definitions.

Towards the end of the book he discusses prejudices, which I find quite truthful and poignant. His main three prejudices of authority are ones I find myself guilty of in varying degrees. The prejudice of personal authority - I do sometimes place too much stock in what others have said or written, at the expense of exercising my own reason. This is a good thing to work on in my philosophical pursuits. The prejudice of the authority of the majority - I must not take others' word on philosophy, but must read it for myself to discover what is correct and what is not. Though starting with better-received philosophers may not be the worst course of action. Finally, the prejudice of authority of the age. Kant speaks of deference to ancient wisdom, despite the retarded state of development of intellect in those days. Well, I disagree with the sweeping generalization that ancients were any less intelligent or well informed on philosophical matters. Indeed, I consider those days a much better time for philosophizing, without the distractions of today. However, I find within myself a prejudice towards favoring the views of the ancients, which I should fight in order to remain impartial.

Emotion and Kant

I was thinking the other day as I was driving about the role of emotion in our lives. The Stoic party line is essentially that emotions are a manifestation of incorrect reason, of irrational thinking. I think that it many cases this is true. Anger, jealousy, disappointment, fear - these all arise from a non-Stoic view of the situation. The mythical Stoic sage surely would not have emotions, but would rather only reason calmly. But emotion does have its uses, and it is here I diverge from Stoic dogma. First of all, God has emotion. At various times in Biblical literature he is angry and at other times he is sympathetic, able to be swayed from his decisions. The original Stoics worshipped the Pantheon of Greek gods and goddesses - surely they too showed emotion. And how can gods be less than perfect? On a more modern note, my second objection is that emotion helps us learn. A strong emotional reaction imprints deeply upon us - a strong feeling of anger, if we are penitent for it, makes us less likely to be angry under the same conditions a second time. What does modern psychology say about completely non-emotional people, assuming such a person exists? Yet while I challenge the theoretical basis that emotion can and should be eradicated, I do subscribe to the theory that emotion should be opposed and minimized, while recognizing it for what it is and how it can help develop us.

I just began reading Kant. I started with an overview of his works, Kant's Introduction to Logic. The first three chapters have been on logic, on what can be known, and on the definition and structure of knowledge. I was interested in reading that mathematics and philosophy are the only rational sciences, all others are empirical. I suppose this means that only mathematics and philosophy can be positively known. Though, I am not sure philosophy is true a priori knowledge. How can it be? How can the study of correct living be known before living? They say mathematics is the only pure science, uncorrupted by observational error and biases and such. I wonder why reason, the basic rules of logic, are not also included in this category. I would hesitate to put them in the a priori category of knowledge, but surely the rules can be positively known.

My New Year's resolution is to read one philosophy book per week. Let's hope I can stick to it.

On Proper Preparation

From Epictetus' Discourses, Book 1, Chapter 17:

If you want to hear about moral improvement, well and good. But if you say to me, "I do not know whether you argue truly or falsely," and if I use an ambiguous word and you say to me "distinguish," I shall grow impatient and say to you, "this is the more pressing need." It is for this reason, I suppose, that men put the processes of logic in the forefront, just as we put the testing of the measure before the measuring of the corn. And if we do not determine first what is the bushel and what is the scale, how shall we be able to measure or weigh anything? So in the sphere of though if we have not fully grasped and trained to perfection the instrument by which we judge other things and understand other things, shall we ever be able to arrive at accurate knowledge? Of course, it is impossible.


Perhaps that will be a new resolution of mine. To pursue the study of logic to bolster my capacity to develop and understand arguments. This brings to mind a passage by Hobbes, from the Leviathan, Part 1, Chapter IV:

Seeing then that truth consisteth in the right ordering of names in our affirmations, a man that seeketh precise truth, had need to remember what every name he uses stands for; and to place it accordingly.


My girlfriend recently tipped me off to an iPod app that presents 4 or so English words a day. I had already had a word of the day, but rarely looked at it. This new app includes a few fancier features and also includes the words of the day in other languages that are part of my Google Reader feed. Perhaps that will satisfy Hobbes.