Book 2 of The Consolation of Philosophy refines many of the arguments Philosophy hinted she would make in Book 1. Much of it is more or less the Stoic party line, or close enough, but two arguments were unique enough to stand out.
The first is that happiness is truly relative. What one person thinks will bring them happiness is the accustomed possession of another. For example, while one may be dismayed to be sent into exile, that new location is of course home for many others. A poor man seeks money, a rich man seeks purpose, an important man seeks leisure, etc. For a long time I considered the theory that the extent to which things make us deviate from a state of happiness is relative. For a starving child, missing a meal is customary, and hence its sting has been neutralized by experience; whereas if a rich man missed a meal it might well be the greatest hardship he experiences in a year. The extent to which each event saddens us or enrages us is proportionate to the amount of hardship we are accustomed to. To an extent, Boethius' writing elaborates on this. Though it would be interesting to see his reaction to more modern studies on happiness, which attempt to quantitatively evaluate happiness as a function of wealth or other variables.
Perhaps the more important argument Philosophy makes is that there is no reason to pursue an important position in civil affairs. This has long been a criticism of Stoicism, that it leaves no room for the Stoic sage to pursue positions in government which could help others. I have not read enough of Stoic personal ethics to judge this criticism, but I think it is fairly accurate, at least when describing the teachings of Zeno and Chrysippus. Philosophy (the mortal, not the discipline) tells Boethius that seeking an important position is tantamount to seeking glory and fame, which of course are worthless and insignificant. The second part of that argument I agree with, but I would not say that seeking a position is identical to seeking glory. Boethius attempts to argue this and is deftly silenced. I do not see why a man may not, for example, try to win high political office for the sole purpose of exercising his virtue to aid others. After all, Stoicism is not solipsism. Indeed, helping others is a good example of the virtue of magnanimity and charity. Perhaps this question will be answered in later Books.
The first is that happiness is truly relative. What one person thinks will bring them happiness is the accustomed possession of another. For example, while one may be dismayed to be sent into exile, that new location is of course home for many others. A poor man seeks money, a rich man seeks purpose, an important man seeks leisure, etc. For a long time I considered the theory that the extent to which things make us deviate from a state of happiness is relative. For a starving child, missing a meal is customary, and hence its sting has been neutralized by experience; whereas if a rich man missed a meal it might well be the greatest hardship he experiences in a year. The extent to which each event saddens us or enrages us is proportionate to the amount of hardship we are accustomed to. To an extent, Boethius' writing elaborates on this. Though it would be interesting to see his reaction to more modern studies on happiness, which attempt to quantitatively evaluate happiness as a function of wealth or other variables.
Perhaps the more important argument Philosophy makes is that there is no reason to pursue an important position in civil affairs. This has long been a criticism of Stoicism, that it leaves no room for the Stoic sage to pursue positions in government which could help others. I have not read enough of Stoic personal ethics to judge this criticism, but I think it is fairly accurate, at least when describing the teachings of Zeno and Chrysippus. Philosophy (the mortal, not the discipline) tells Boethius that seeking an important position is tantamount to seeking glory and fame, which of course are worthless and insignificant. The second part of that argument I agree with, but I would not say that seeking a position is identical to seeking glory. Boethius attempts to argue this and is deftly silenced. I do not see why a man may not, for example, try to win high political office for the sole purpose of exercising his virtue to aid others. After all, Stoicism is not solipsism. Indeed, helping others is a good example of the virtue of magnanimity and charity. Perhaps this question will be answered in later Books.
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