Stoic Principles of Matter

The Stoics split the universe into the 'whole', consisting of the physical world we live on, and 'void', an infinite expanse outside of our world. The two of them collectively comprised the 'all'. The known world was then divided into matter and logos, or God. The Stoic god was conceived as a characteristic of matter common to all matter - it is what makes matter peculiarly qualified. This is a roundabout manner of explaining how substance can be peculiarly qualified, and why all matter is peculiarly qualified. Note that Calcidius, who I haven't heard of it, confirms my belief that no bit of matter could possibly be without peculiar characteristics - such is the result of the twinning of matter and logos.

Sextus Empiricus makes an interesting side argument, however. Matter can be either self-moving, or moved by another power. The basis for scientific thought is that all actions have causes - all matter is moved by another power. Since imagining a universe that solely consists of passive matter would lead to an endless regression of higher order causes, there must be a power which is self-moving. If that self-moving power were of a finite length of time, some higher order power must cause it to start. Hence, "the power which moves matter and guides it in due order into generations and changes is everlasting. So this power would be [G]od."

On Redundancy and Determinism

Sextus Empiricus claims that arguments are invalid if they are redundant. The example he uses, the premise 'if it is day, it is light' is such a redundancy, though I will overlook my disagreement with even that basic premise. Such a premise, in which the conditions follows directly and obviously from the antecedent, is 'invalid'. This backs Stoic logic into a corner, in my view. Empiricus admits this. If a premise is true, then the conditional can be directly deduced, and so it is invalid. If, on the other hand, the premise is false, than it will certainly be invalid as well. How then, can arguments proceed?

The prevailing attitude of the Stoics towards Sophist arguments was to ignore them. Arguments like the Sorites argument, or Little-by-Little argument. A good example is asking how many grains of corn make a heap of corn. By increasing the number of grains one by one, the addressee must eventually choose a number of grains which makes a heap of grain a heap - however, having picked a number, if that amount of grains is reduced by one then the heap should no longer exist. This is a thought-provoking argument, if rather useless, but the Stoics tend to minimize and ostracize the Sophists. It seems to me such an argument is good food for thought and a good mental exercise, and shouldn't be rejected out of hand.

Diodorus and Chrysippus were also engaged in a long argument, essentially about whether a thing can be possible if it never occurs. I think this is fascinating. If something doesn't occur, was it ever really possible? Likewise, if something occurs, was it not a necessity? For an example, I reach to my own history. Was it ever possible for me to attend Harvard? Conventionally, I would say yes. I have enough raw intelligence that I could have exerted myself sufficiently to be accepted there. In a sense, that future was possible. But in a more literal sense, it was never a possibility. As events in my life have borne out, I was not interested in academics until high school. Even then I came nowhere close to exerting myself. In that sense, then, attending Harvard was never a possibility. Sure, qualifying circumstances would change the truth of that statement - IF my past was different, THEN I could have attended. But that restructures the proposition. As Chrysippus noted, however, this outlook tends to remove moral responsibility from the actor. Let's say I cheated on a test in high school, which I did more than once. Sure, I accept responsibility for that. But on the other hand, the confluence of academic pressure, peer pressure, and the course of events to that point made my actions a necessity. To not cheat was possible, but never a possibility. 


Yet, the Stoics anguished over holding on to moral responsibility in the face of this argument. I cannot reject such responsibility, even though I agree with the conflicting theory of relative determinism. Obviously, I don't claim the two are compatible.

Chrysippus' argument: "If there is motion without cause, not every proposition will be either true or false, since anything lacking efficient causes will be neither true nor false. But every proposition is either true or false. Therefore there is no motion without a cause. If this is so, everything that happens happens through antecedent causes - in which case, everything happens through fate. The result is that everything that happens happens through fate."

Epicurean Philosophy

"Epicurus used to say that philosophy is an activity which by arguments and discussions brings about the happy life." - Sextus Empiricus

No, this isn't a summary of Epicurean philosophy as a whole. Rather, it is a reflection on Epicurean views on philosophy and philosophizing. Epicurus favored a lifelong study of philosophy, stating, "no one is underage or overage for health of the soul." Philosophy is the most desirable intellectual pursuit, while the study of culture (in his day, mathematics and rhetoric) is pointless. Natural philosophy is important as well, but only because we have a human desire to know those things; if we were perfectly at peace with ourselves, ignorance of the world would not be a problem.

Of course I disagree that any subject at all is not worth studying. Some are certainly more important, granted, but all information and learning is inherently at least somewhat valuable. Mathematics and rhetoric, as well as the modern-day definition of culture, are very worthwhile things. I think many people would agree with me that part of a person's purpose in life is to be a human being, to experience the human condition. Consuming culture is a part of that. Natural philosophy is important in much the same way.

On the question of who should study philosophy, however, I have no answer. I am of two minds. One tells me that every person that can reason should be exposed to philosophy. It is the most important intellectual pursuit a person can have. Without philosophy, we have no purpose, or at least not one that we know and recognize. However, the other side of the argument is that philosophy can be powerful or daunting in the hands of those who cannot yet understand it. Perhaps a healthy background in rhetoric, literature, and worldly experience is necessary to piece together the truths and untruths of philosophy. How could I understand philosophy if I had not experienced what I have? Could I have read these words when I was much younger and still understood them? I also cannot put out of my mind the impressionability of young minds. This is not a question that demands an answer, but it is an intriguing one.