Book 3, to my knowledge for the first time in The Consolation of Philosophy, makes extensive use of the Socratic method. By that, I mean a series of rhetorical questions, simply answered affirmatively or negatively, which push the argument towards a desired conclusion. I rather like this style of argument, if done correctly and without missing connections. Boethius doesn't err in his style, but rather in substance. The meat of this chapter is essentially that happiness comprises 5 things: independence, power, renown, glory, and bodily pleasure. Towards the end of the chapter he changes somewhat to adoration of God and a heavily simplified proof of why God must exist. Descartes and Spinoza offered much more in-depth arguments along the same lines for why God must exist and what He is - both arguments, by the way, I disagree with, not on the basis of their conclusion, but on the means.
What perplexes me is the inclusion of glory and renown within happiness. Power is also a strange choice, although perhaps less strange. It was not even yesterday that I was reading Boethius denounce glory as an insignificant, transient condition. Indeed, at the beginning of Book 3 he restates [Philosophy's] objections to desiring glory and fame. Yet, they are included in the definition of happiness. How can fame and glory, which are temporal and at the whim of popular opinion, constitute happiness? For happiness must be independent of others, at least it was before modern psychology. Boethius had seemed to be a budding Stoic; now I must revise that appellation. Power is also anathema to the Stoic's definition of happiness.
At the end of Book 3, I am quite in doubt of Boethius' ability to turn this book around, into a complete and coherent presentation.
What perplexes me is the inclusion of glory and renown within happiness. Power is also a strange choice, although perhaps less strange. It was not even yesterday that I was reading Boethius denounce glory as an insignificant, transient condition. Indeed, at the beginning of Book 3 he restates [Philosophy's] objections to desiring glory and fame. Yet, they are included in the definition of happiness. How can fame and glory, which are temporal and at the whim of popular opinion, constitute happiness? For happiness must be independent of others, at least it was before modern psychology. Boethius had seemed to be a budding Stoic; now I must revise that appellation. Power is also anathema to the Stoic's definition of happiness.
At the end of Book 3, I am quite in doubt of Boethius' ability to turn this book around, into a complete and coherent presentation.
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