On Proper Preparation

From Epictetus' Discourses, Book 1, Chapter 17:

If you want to hear about moral improvement, well and good. But if you say to me, "I do not know whether you argue truly or falsely," and if I use an ambiguous word and you say to me "distinguish," I shall grow impatient and say to you, "this is the more pressing need." It is for this reason, I suppose, that men put the processes of logic in the forefront, just as we put the testing of the measure before the measuring of the corn. And if we do not determine first what is the bushel and what is the scale, how shall we be able to measure or weigh anything? So in the sphere of though if we have not fully grasped and trained to perfection the instrument by which we judge other things and understand other things, shall we ever be able to arrive at accurate knowledge? Of course, it is impossible.


Perhaps that will be a new resolution of mine. To pursue the study of logic to bolster my capacity to develop and understand arguments. This brings to mind a passage by Hobbes, from the Leviathan, Part 1, Chapter IV:

Seeing then that truth consisteth in the right ordering of names in our affirmations, a man that seeketh precise truth, had need to remember what every name he uses stands for; and to place it accordingly.


My girlfriend recently tipped me off to an iPod app that presents 4 or so English words a day. I had already had a word of the day, but rarely looked at it. This new app includes a few fancier features and also includes the words of the day in other languages that are part of my Google Reader feed. Perhaps that will satisfy Hobbes.

Ancient Checks and Balances

Today, Spinoza served up a heavy dose of ancient Hebrew politics. I thought he wrote very clearly on this subject and I would like to reflect upon it.

He first defined theocracy. That the ancient Hebrew state was a pure theocracy, God being the head of state. I immediately thought of the modern famous theocracy - Iran. I don't know much about Iranian politics, but I would doubt they are a true theocracy. I don't believe the people have entered into a covenant with Allah, and sworn to serve him as devotees and citizens alike. I wonder just how different the two governments are.

But the meat of this section, as it pertains to this post at least, was on the political setup after Moses' death. The high priests alone could interpret God's word. However, they could only do it when the Generals of each of the 12 tribes requested it. And the tribes were never confederated - they acted as individuals, sometimes allying and sometimes fighting, but always as individual tribes. I suppose the Romans and earlier empires also had such checks and balances, but the Hebrews must have been the first to shrug off a despotic system.

The last part of the book covers why the first instance of the Hebrew state ended. It essentially boils down to people losing faith in the government. They wanted a seat at the table but couldn't have one, and so they ended up tearing the state apart from the inside. The way Spinoza addressed this issue was actually quite Machiavellian in terms of style.

Can a true theocracy ever exist? I don't think so. The opportunity for corruption is simply too obvious. This seems to be the case with many of the Middle Eastern countries. In principle there is nothing wrong with the idea. A pure theocracy would require active participation by God, leading the state and giving orders and laws. This seems unlikely. A modern theocracy could, however, simply be built around worship and right action. I see no reason why that couldn't work. If you could find an honest, righteous group of people to lead the government, that is.

I wonder if that supports Hobbes' notions of man's nature that good governments simply don't just develop. Good men just don't get that far. I can't see this being ingrained corruption either, because a really just man would endure whatever he had to to get his high position, and would then enact beneficial reforms. You just don't see that happening. Maybe it is true that power corrupts. Or maybe man is inherently evil, and it is only the exceptional man who can follow the straight and narrow.

What is treason?

Whatever his reason be for acting, the crime is treason. - Spinoza

I had to read over this particular atomic argument again. He makes the case that a man commits treason when he tries to usurp sovereignty after he has already forfeited his rights to another, namely the state. More concretely, a man who has entered into a covenant and become part of society no longer has the right to make the decisions (unless he were the sovereign, of course). This is all very Hobbesian, and Spinoza actually seems to have very similar political views (except he is not nearly so pessimistic on human nature). A man who thus is a citizen of a state is treasonous if he tries to take that state's power for himself.

A few seconds' contemplation will confirm the usual definition of treason. A soldier who gives up his army's position or intentions is clearly trying to usurp the power of making strategic and diplomatic decisions. He is rightfully called a traitor (I wonder if that word comes from the same root as treason...). However, Spinoza then goes out to argue that even the positive act can be a treasonous. A vigilante soldier who defies his commander and advances alone to kill the enemy is also a traitor - he too wants to usurp power from his generals and government officials.

I suppose here the ambiguity of language certainly plays a part. I see where Spinoza is going with his argument. The well-intentioned misbehavior is just as detrimental to order as the badly-intentioned misbehavior - perhaps even moreso. As a military officer, I truly agree that both types of insubordination have negative consequences. However I'm not sure you would call the well-meaning man treasonous. Treason has a certain definition, and it doesn't necessarily just mean insubordinate. I associate nuance with the word. Miriam-Webster defines treason as 1. betrayal of trust, but 2. the overt act of trying to overthrow a government. I would argue that most (English-speaking) people associate treason with negative betrayal.

But I suppose this is a semantic argument at beast. The treatise wasn't written in English, and ideas do get muddled in translation.

And after some research - yes, traitor and treason share a root in the Latin 'traditor'.

Will and Understanding

Interesting tidbit tonight. Descartes argues that the greatest gifts given to humanity were understanding and will. Understanding is essentially pure and right - we perceive and conceive correctly. I don't interpret this literally, to mean that everybody is always right (although, on an egoist level, this is true), but rather that understanding is not where we fall short. He goes on to reason that the will is where we err - we often take action or pass judgement on that which we do not understand, and this is the source of error. To this point, I agree. The human intellect is surely capable of grappling with the relatively easy mental hurdles we face everyday, especially with the help of others. As Hobbes wrote, this is why all men are created equal - because the dumbest man may outsmart the smartest; the range of human intellect is simply not very big. Where we run into moral dilemmas (and for Descartes, sin) is when we act on that which we do not understand.

I'm not sure where to go from here though. I'm not sure I can accurately judge what I properly or not understand. And this proposition is essentially contradictory - it passes judgement on others who we cannot know for sure have faulty understanding. What if, unbeknownst to Descartes and I, every other person fully understand nature and theology and natural science, and rather chose to act as though they did not? Can this proposition be reasoned out, or must there be an empirical basis for it? And if there is an empiricism present in it... well then how can a man who has a Devil set out to deceive him believe such a thing?

Utility

Finished Utilitarianism this morning, I found it a very agreeable take on things and I support Mill's disinterested view of the merit of happiness. His morality is very much subjective, and I like that; perhaps it is even a little too subjective. To begin with, he concludes that happiness is the end of man (end meaning goal) and everything else is but a means to that end. I think this is useful so far as it pertains to the temporal state of man, but when religion is taken into account then happiness is not the true aim anymore. Mill tries to get around this by saying a benevolent God would wish his creatures to be happy, but I'm not sure this is really true. Certainly, happiness is a positive quality in humanity, but virtue must also have a place. For example, perhaps everyone could be made more happy (total happiness increases) if religion were abolished, and hence religiously-inspired strife also ended. But I don't think many people would see this as a good at all. Later in the book, Mill discusses justice, and rights. I have yet to understand his take on how the two meet - what if total happiness could be increased by the seizure of a few rights?

There's an interesting comparison of virtue to money, in terms of their utility. Money is a means to an end, a means to fulfill our pleasures and desires. However, money is often seen as an end in itself; but this is not entirely a bad thing. If money is a source of happiness, instead of a means to it, then the ultimate end of happiness is still achievable, and perhaps moreso. Virtue can be seen in this light. Disregarding the religious ramifications of virtue, it is a means to an end, to achieving a society in spite of our Hobbesian tendencies. However, it has become to many people an end in itself - which if it produces happiness, is all the better. Which brings me to...

The morality of utilitarianism does not distinguish among motives. A man who saves a drowning man altruistically is no different, morally, than the man does that expecting a reward. Intention does matter, so a man who saves a drowning man only to inflict pain on him later is still immoral. But unlike Kantian ethics, actions are evaluated purely on their consequences - this jibes well with Nietzsche.

Finally, my favorite quote. "It is better to be a man dissatisfied than a pig satisfied." Pleasures of the mind are greater than pleasures of the body. I found a similar tenet in the Enchiridion. Bentham believed that all pleasure was equal, which sounds like hedonism. But Mill's utilitarianism does differentiate.

In other news, listened to a podcast on the history of the Roman empire today. This should be useful since so many classical writers refer to Roman figures. And I've been reading much about the Incan empire lately. I was very surprised to learn that the empire only lasted for about 100 years, from 1438 to about 1533. Surprising how advanced they were in some areas and how deficient in others - learning about them at the same time as reading Guns, Germs, and Steel helps shed perspective on those deficiencies as well.