Stoic Determinism 3

The collection of primary sources regarding 'moral responsibility' once again triggered anguish over determinism. Chrysippus favored complete determinism, encompassing even attitudes and impressions - this view became the party line after a few generations. The question that this early Stoic debate piques is about partial determinism. Is such a system possible? In a completely determined world, I would agree that there cannot be moral responsibility. To borrow from a recent Dinosaur Comic, a completely undetermined (random) world would also lack moral responsibility. Hence, only a partially determined world can have morality.

But is such a thing possible? The only way I can see this possibility arising is if consciousness is not deterministic. Does human consciousness violate the laws of the science, of the universe? Can there be results without antecedent causes? I have a hard time grasping the possibility of this, but I concede it could be. Only if this is true can morality have any meaning.

Chrysippus argued, "The result is that neither commendations nor reproofs, nor honors nor punishments are just." I do disagree with this, however, even if moral responsibility is nonexistent. I say this because incentives are a method by which fate can work. The existence of incentives change the calculus of decisions ex ante. Even in a fully determined world, then, punishment must exist. For even if the world proceeds according to preset laws, like a ticking watch, the structure of incentives is then like the cogs of the watch - affecting how it operates.

The necessity of incentives in any system does beg the question - is such an incentive just? Is it just to punish a criminal if he was 'fated' to have committed the crime? Overlooking the fact that punishment was necessary to dissuade untold numbers of other would-be criminals, is it right to punish the actual criminal? Does the appearance of freedom of action make positive or negative incentives right? These are not easy questions.

Diogenes Laertius writes, "The story goes that Zeno was flogging a slave for stealing. 'I was fated to steal', said the slave. 'And to be flogged', was Zeno's reply."

On Sensation and Truth

At the heart of epistemology is the debate between empiricism and rationalism. Can we discover truths just by sensing them, with our eyes and ears? Or must truths come from our minds, from careful reasoning? Perhaps Descartes is correct - the only truth is that I exist, in some form or another.

Of course the Greeks got in on the debate, but I was surprised by the Stoics' open embrace of pure empiricism. According to essentially every Stoic philosopher, all things are peculiarly qualified and can, as such, give a 'cognitive impression'. That is, an impression which is completely distinct; one can 'grasp' the impression and know its truth. I can't agree to this. I do believe that there are things which are so identical to one another than they absolutely cannot be positively identified. What would the Stoics say of individual atoms, which are absolutely homogenous, if only with today's technology. They claim that twins and identical eggs and other such dualities known to them can be identified 'with sufficient effort and expertise'. Yet, the human senses are limited to certain resolutions and accuracies - it is therefore possible that the subtleties between two objectively different things will be below the threshold detectable by a human.

Impressions are of two sorts, at the most basic level - true impressions, and false impressions (figments). The Academics brought up continuously the fact that there will never be a true impression that cannot be imitated exactly by a false one. The Stoics defended themselves by adding clauses, essentially, to their criteria for truth. A true impression must also concur with preconceptions, then. However, preconceptions are created through experience.... hence, the argument is ultimately redundant.

Diogenes Laertius relates an example: Ptolemy Philopator placed before a philosopher named Sphaerus some wax pomegranates. When Sphaerus was tricked into believing they were real, Ptolemy rejoiced, as he had proved the Academics' argument. However, Sphaerus claimed he had not assented to the true impression they were pomegranates, but rather assented to the impression that it was reasonable that they were pomegranates.

Perhaps Sphaerus truly believed in the distinction between the two impressions. I think most people, however, desire objective truth, not a recognizance of the possibility of truth. How can we make conclusions about the world if we are only recognizing that the world 'possibly' works in this way? No, objective truth is needed, and the Stoics never did identify an objectively acceptable way of sorting truth from fiction. When specific examples were used to illustrate the fallacy of sense-data, they claimed that the individuals in question were not acting 'under normal circumstances', meaning the Stoics did not agree they were acting as rational actors. Perhaps this is reminiscent of the Stoic sage archetype. In Stoic ethics, the sage is a perfect human, but realistically unattainable. That is acceptable as a goal or role model. However, in epistemology, having an unattainable state of existence being the only one capable of discerning truth is NOT acceptable. If I'm going to believe in the objective truth of sense-data, it's not going to be because of the Stoics.