Showing posts with label Epicureanism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Epicureanism. Show all posts

Monday, April 2, 2012

On Indivisibility

The chapter on 'continuum' in Stoic thought brought up many interesting paradoxes. I should note that the Stoics rejected the atomism of Epicureans - that the physical world consisted of indivisible quanta, the building blocks of everything. To a certain extent the Epicureans were vindicated by modern science. But the Stoic continuum, if only applied conceptually, still raises important questions.

Which contains more parts, a body or a finger? The simple answer is the body, for it comprises ten fingers plus much more. But a finger contains infinitely many parts. Even considering the modern scientific understand, a finger can still be conceptually divided into infinitely many parts. The body can be likewise divided. So then, a body and a finger have the same number of parts. Or at least, they are both comprised of infinitely many parts. Obviously this conflicts with our empirical understanding of both things.

What is a limit? The Stoics held it was incorporeal, a mere construct of the mind. The Epicureans were free to envision it as the boundary between atoms, a plane dividing the atoms of one thing from the atoms of another. The importance of this argument is somewhat different today. Take the smallest, most indivisible thing we can postulate. To my knowledge, this would be the single string in string theory; it is the smallest thing that can exist, and nothing can occur at any length shorter than the string's length, for the string has no parts which may interact. Yet, how can a string border another string? Obviously, a whole cannot border a whole. Conceptually it is obvious that a part of the string must border a part of a second string. But how can this be if both are indivisible?

Take a cone and cut it horizontally. Examine the two new surfaces you have created, the upper and lower surfaces that define your cut. Are they equal in magnitude? For if they are, when does the cone change its breadth? If they are not equal in magnitude, the cone was never continuous, but was only planes of material stacked atop one another. The modern understanding of atoms has effectively nullified this argument, but I haven't thought of this before.

Finally, a corollary to Zeno's famous distance paradox. It is clear that when a runner completes a lap around the track, he cannot have run the distance at once. It is obvious to us that it was broken into divisions - one foot was completed, then another, and so on until the lap was completed. But why only divide to a foot? For any distance, however small, can be divided infinitely. First the first inch of the track must be traversed. But wait, now the first micrometer of the track must be traversed. But how can the runner travel even one micrometer, if he has not completed the first half-micrometer? And so on. All motion, conceptually, is hindered by an infinite regression of ever-smaller first distances. When I was studying aeronautics in college, I once had to write a basic computer program which used differential equations. For velocity to increase from zero, acceleration must be infinite - any change from zero to a nonzero number involves an infinite rate of change over a short enough time scale. We of course used constants and workarounds to make the program work - but how does nature really work? For infinite acceleration cannot occur. But if acceleration were to suddenly increase from zero to non-zero, then the derivative of acceleration would be infinite. This, too, is infinitely regressive.

It is a wonder physics works at all.

Tuesday, March 20, 2012

Epicurean Philosophy

"Epicurus used to say that philosophy is an activity which by arguments and discussions brings about the happy life." - Sextus Empiricus

No, this isn't a summary of Epicurean philosophy as a whole. Rather, it is a reflection on Epicurean views on philosophy and philosophizing. Epicurus favored a lifelong study of philosophy, stating, "no one is underage or overage for health of the soul." Philosophy is the most desirable intellectual pursuit, while the study of culture (in his day, mathematics and rhetoric) is pointless. Natural philosophy is important as well, but only because we have a human desire to know those things; if we were perfectly at peace with ourselves, ignorance of the world would not be a problem.

Of course I disagree that any subject at all is not worth studying. Some are certainly more important, granted, but all information and learning is inherently at least somewhat valuable. Mathematics and rhetoric, as well as the modern-day definition of culture, are very worthwhile things. I think many people would agree with me that part of a person's purpose in life is to be a human being, to experience the human condition. Consuming culture is a part of that. Natural philosophy is important in much the same way.

On the question of who should study philosophy, however, I have no answer. I am of two minds. One tells me that every person that can reason should be exposed to philosophy. It is the most important intellectual pursuit a person can have. Without philosophy, we have no purpose, or at least not one that we know and recognize. However, the other side of the argument is that philosophy can be powerful or daunting in the hands of those who cannot yet understand it. Perhaps a healthy background in rhetoric, literature, and worldly experience is necessary to piece together the truths and untruths of philosophy. How could I understand philosophy if I had not experienced what I have? Could I have read these words when I was much younger and still understood them? I also cannot put out of my mind the impressionability of young minds. This is not a question that demands an answer, but it is an intriguing one.

Epicurean Death

"Against other things it is possible to obtain security. But when it comes to death we human beings all live in an unwalled city." - Epicurus

I don't like Epicurean ethics. They're well put together, but the hedonist core of that philosophy seems morally reprehensible. I suppose there's no good objective argument to self-fulfillment, so I won't go down that road. There are contradictions in the philosophy, however, and the most recent chapter illustrates that.

Epicurus valued friendship, declaring that not only did such a relationship contribute to pleasure, but that is should be uniquely valued as producing a special sort of happiness. It is equally clear that later followers of Epicurus agreed with his stance, though his critics pointed out the obvious contradiction with an egocentric philosophy. Nonetheless, Epicurus's view on death is that it is a welcome respite from the aggravation of living. Death is the cessation of both pleasure and pain - it should not be feared. Yet, if friendship is a value, why should we not value life for the opportunity it gives us to provide friendship to others? The main argument for Epicureanism is that a life lived well is defined independently of duration. A man who enjoys his life has lived a good one, whether it be 30 years long or 70. But those 40 extra years could provide a young man an entirely lifetime of happiness through finding an enlightened friend - how can that not be thought of as a good? I realize Epicurus was not concerned with the good beyond oneself, but this oversight seems glaring.

Another point - Lucretius, an Epicurean, declares that living to prolong one's life is a bad decision. He ranks living in moderation as equal to denying oneself pleasures, and thus in the Epicurean tradition, refusing to live a 'complete' life. His claim can easily be reduced to absurd conclusions. Would he look favorably upon a child who lives the best life he can - and dies before his tenth birthday due to bad habits? For instance, immunizations cause us pain when we get them, but for an inestimable benefit later. Would Lucretius have opposed vaccinations? On the other side of the spectrum, what of an elderly man who spends a week every year at the doctor's office so he can live an additional twenty years. Surely giving up a week of your time to waiting is no Epicurean good - but twenty extra years? I have a feeling Epicureans would favor the first scenario but oppose the second, but I see them in much the same light.

This all being said, there were many positive, thought-provoking comments sprinkled throughout this penultimate Epicurean chapter. "Here on earth, the life of the foolish becomes hell." - Lucretius

Monday, March 5, 2012

Epicurean Paradoxes

Epicurus was a very smart guy. I am only two short chapters into Epicurean physics, based largely on a few extant paragraphs from Epicurus and Lucretius. In a few short minutes, I have been presented with two seemingly intractable paradoxes.

Epicurus, one in a long line of Greek philosophers with the same beliefs, held that matter could not be created or destroyed. Matter did not come from nothing, and could not be destroyed into nothing. Anything that is, is tangible and has a size and weight. In this light, I wonder what a thought it. For, clearly it changes the person who receives it; it adds something to a person. Yet, it is created ex nihilo; from nothing. Likewise, it returns to nothing. Furthermore, a thought is weightless and has no size - how then, can it be added to a person and produce an observable change? If something with no size or weight is added, then nothing is added - but anecdotally, this cannot be so! I have tried approaching thoughts as a particular combination of electrons and synaptic connections, but even then, the paradox remains. For a thought may be transmitted to a person with no physical communication, by body language or even intuition. How then, can the addition of nothing produce a different sum?

The second paradox involves voids and bodies. Epicurus held that bodies were made of matter, and voids the lack thereof. Modern science jibes with him - there are atoms, and the inconceivable empty space between atoms. This empty space, then, is a void. So, what happens when a body moves? It enters the void, but the void is not displaced. The void must then be coexistent with the body. How can this be so? How can nothing dissolve into nothing, or be created from nothing? Where does the empty space go, and how can it coexist with a body? Furthermore, what can modern quantum mechanics say on this subject, when seemingly empty spaces can give rise to pairs of particles?