The Consolation of Philosophy IV

I don't think I found one iota of useful discourse in this chapter. The main argument is that while it may seem that good people sometimes experience hardship, and bad people sometimes profit, that really this doesn't happen. The good are also truly powerful, and the bad are truly powerless.

To make these conclusions Boethius has to carefully define many terms and concepts, sometimes redefining what he spoke of in previous chapters. Happiness is still the unity of independence, power, fame, glory, and pleasure. Pursuit of that happiness is divine and truly good. Good people, in making advances towards happiness, are powerful and bad people are powerless as they do not advance towards happiness. This is a conclusion of his - I don't follow. It also appears Boethius defines good and evil as a dichotomy; a person is either good, or bad. Nowhere does he mention how he separates people, and nowhere does he even pay lip service to the idea of a graduated scale of good and evil.

Most of the latter half of the chapter concerns how God administers the universe, and why we (incorrectly) perceive injustice. I found the argument to be shallow and poorly evidenced, even considering the early state of the Christian religion at the time. Descartes and Spinoza had much better theological arguments, and Seneca had a much clearer discussion of why good things happen to bad people.

On Miracles

Got through Chapter 6 of Tractatus Theologico-Politicus tonight. On Miracles. I found Spinoza to be essentially writing down my exact views, though in a bit more flowery language. Miracles are not interruptions of the natural order of things; on the contrary, they are only possible within the framework of natural laws. Nature is an extension of God's will, and so any projections of God's will must necessarily cooperate with the laws he has set down. Any interpretation of miracles as anything more is the hallmark of misunderstanding. I suppose this might explain why there haven't been the same frequency of miracles as it has been indicated existed a few thousand years ago. Spinoza seems to believe that Scripture was specifically written this way in order to capture the minds of the less educated, who would not be likely to use reason in their approach to religion. It is up to the educated man to reason out this principles, with Spinoza's help of course. I don't believe this approach is much different than Descartes'. In a future time I'll have time to compare the two. More likely, someone has already written a book on it.

Portuguese is going, but I find myself neglecting it in favor of reading. I've been on a push to finish my normal nonfiction book (The World is Flat by Friedman). I was making pitiful progress in it and decided I didn't want to kick it around for the next year. I also want to finish Murchie, if only to free up that second philosophy slot for another book. It's almost time to order a new set, too. I tried to start a habit of expanding my knowledge on the arts by reading a Wikipedia article per day, but I simply don't have the time to commit to that. Perhaps if I don't mind skipping a day here and there, it will become a more realistically achievable goal.

Will and Understanding

Interesting tidbit tonight. Descartes argues that the greatest gifts given to humanity were understanding and will. Understanding is essentially pure and right - we perceive and conceive correctly. I don't interpret this literally, to mean that everybody is always right (although, on an egoist level, this is true), but rather that understanding is not where we fall short. He goes on to reason that the will is where we err - we often take action or pass judgement on that which we do not understand, and this is the source of error. To this point, I agree. The human intellect is surely capable of grappling with the relatively easy mental hurdles we face everyday, especially with the help of others. As Hobbes wrote, this is why all men are created equal - because the dumbest man may outsmart the smartest; the range of human intellect is simply not very big. Where we run into moral dilemmas (and for Descartes, sin) is when we act on that which we do not understand.

I'm not sure where to go from here though. I'm not sure I can accurately judge what I properly or not understand. And this proposition is essentially contradictory - it passes judgement on others who we cannot know for sure have faulty understanding. What if, unbeknownst to Descartes and I, every other person fully understand nature and theology and natural science, and rather chose to act as though they did not? Can this proposition be reasoned out, or must there be an empirical basis for it? And if there is an empiricism present in it... well then how can a man who has a Devil set out to deceive him believe such a thing?

On Solipsism

I faintly remember reading once upon a time that solipsism's few spokesmen included Descartes. Well, how true. In Meditations on the First Philosophy, he often speaks of a Devil who exists solely to deceive him in everything. This is the 1600s version of the brain in a vat hypothesis. I don't believe such a thought device to have any bearing on reality, but is useful in exploring epistemology and logic. Descartes wonders what he can know rationally, since of course no empirical data can be trusted. As I detailed in my last post, he extrapolates this out to proving God's existence, which he does once more along similar lines of thought in this text. I still do not agree, but I appreciate the completely inward-looking method. Curiously, though, Descartes states that the only things he can truly know is that he is and that he was. It is strange that he believes he can trust his memory, seeing as he clearly cannot trust his other senses. Perhaps he could not imagine false memories, though he does speak of dreams and the false ideas he gets from them. This is truly a topic I could get more into, perhaps I will look into that the next time I buy books (3 more came today, so it will be a while).

In his proof on God, he writes something that I found absolutely magnificent. He states that many common ideas of ours are only held as negations of other ideas. When I examined this notion, I found it quite true. When I think of infinity, I can only thing of the negation of finiteness. This seems to be a limitation of the mind. He also cites repose, which we only view as the negation of motion. I am still unsure on this, though it would seem I cannot imagine absolute calm either. A useful though experiment next time I am bored.

Proof that God exists?

Discourse on Method was quite refreshing, I enjoyed returning to the dry, straightforward writing of the older days. I was rather impressed to find that Descartes was a stoic, which subsequently led me to discovering there was a noted period of revived stoicism in the 16th and 17th centuries. I rather hope some of the philosophers of the day wrote on that subject.

In Chapter IV, Descartes proves God exists. Well, in his view he does. In the spirit of his mathematical reduction of all philosophy, indeed all natural sciences, I have broken the proof into three 'atomic propositions' (thanks, Wittgenstein!).

I am imperfect, because I doubt. This followed directly from his oft-quoted 'Cogito, ergo sum'. I find no fault here. Doubt, among other human mental activities such as sadness and disappointment, are undeniable facts of the human condition. And I do agree that they make us imperfect. It would seem that if anyone were able to quell their sadness, or do away with disappointment, they would be a better and happier person. Closer to perfection, you could say. So yes, human beings are imperfect. This does raise a troubling question, however - what does this outlook tell us about animals, or better yet, insects? For insects truly are alive. We are starting out here to prove God, so necessarily we must begin without Him - and so, humans cannot be separated from insects by the assumption of a soul. However, insects (it would seem) do not feel sadness, nor disappointment, nor doubt. Are they, then, perfect? A question for another day.

Imperfection requires that there be perfection. Not his words, but this essentially covers the second atomic proposition. I do not buy into this one. First of all, it is necessary that we define perfection. In this case it seems we are talking about happiness, essentially, though it sounds more banal that I mean it. But can a person ever be 100% happy? Can any living or thinking thing be 100% satisfied? I am not sure of it. Secondly, I do not believe imperfection implies the existence of perfection. In Descartes's argument, he knows of perfection, and since ideas cannot simply arise in his head, it must have come from something, namely in this case, the existence of God. Well, this is problematic. I do not think the mean implies the extreme - I know of good and evil, but cannot imagine a 'pure' evil. And I also do not believe that ideas cannot simply be thought up, with the necessary seeds of course. Imperfection itself is enough to spark the idea of perfection, despite the absence or presence of it.

God is the only perfect being, therefore He exists. Also a non-starter, though I'm closer to believing this one. I do not believe God is perfect. Biblical stories show us that God was persuaded in favor of or against certain actions (doubt), showed remorse for actions, and of course, expressed disappointment. How then can He be perfect?

It may be worth noting that I do believe in God, and that He is supremely good, etc. I simply disagree with the above proof.

Back to Stoicism

Well, I finished Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Frankly, I'm glad. There wasn't anything comment-worthy over the last few nights of reading, and now I can move on to bigger and better things. The editor thoughtfully included some critical reviews of Nietzsche in the back of the book - I'm comforted with how many others also agree that there are better philosophers out there. It is not that Nietzsche doesn't have good ideas, it's just that I think his presentation is ineffective.

I ordered six new books , two of which should arrive as early as tomorrow, so I can start on them after I get through Descartes, which has been waiting patiently on my nightstand. I ordered Schopenhauer's Essays, Kant's Critique of Practical Reason, Spinoza's Theologico-Political Treatise, all 4 volumes of The Discourses by Epictetus, and a commentary on stoicism. I am quite looking forward to getting back to stoicism - the commentary will perhaps be the first that I pick up.

As I continue to learn Portuguese, though already and perhaps unfortunately I am focusing more on vocabulary and grammar, I am vexed by the thought that I didn't pay Russian enough attention. Perhaps I could develop it more - but do I really have time for two languages? I am barely making progress in Portuguese. At the moment I think all I can try for is to pay a little closer attention to the Russian I expose myself to everyday. If only I had learned to listen, it would be so much easier to maintain...