The last of Seneca's Dialogues and Essays was On Earthquakes, Book 6 of his Natural Questions. I will add that I am interested in reading the remainder of this large work on the natural sciences. It is true that most of his actual scientific theory is sadly outdated. I am sure that with the information available to him the book was once a valuable resource, but it is now interesting only as a relic of ancient thinking. His causes of earthquakes include large underground caverns of water, fire, and (his personal belief) the agitation of air trapped within the Earth; how the air becomes agitated, I do not know. It is somewhat disheartening to realize just how stunted natural science was in those days, but I suppose that means little to Seneca's other successes. This work, even, is sprinkled with valuable philosophical afterthoughts that tie the science into knowledge useful for all educated people.
One of the more curious things I found in the reading was this: "The reward will be to know Nature, and no prize is greater than this. The subject has numerous features which will prove useful, but the perusal of this material contains nothing more beautiful in itself than that by means of its own splendor it engages the minds of men and is cultivated, not for the sake of profit, but for the wonder it excites."
I wish I more clearly understood Seneca's meaning here. It seems to me he is saying that knowledge of this subject is valuable only in itself, not for the purpose which the knowledge serves. On the surface, this begs the question: is knowledge valuable for itself? I certainly believe it is. Knowledge is good because it is knowledge, not as a means to an end. Much like virtue is desirable only for itself. Though this does raise another issue - knowledge itself is not a virtue, and as a Stoic I recognize that virtue is the highest and most desirable possession. What place, then, does knowledge have? Is it only a means to an end, a means to achieve virtue? Delving more deeply into Seneca's statement, why is knowledge not valuable as a means to an end? Greater understanding of earthquakes has allowed modern man to minimize the danger to human life, better design buildings and possessions to withstand damage, and alter human development to avoid threat to the previous two categories. However, Seneca's particularly ambivalent attitude towards human life and possessions would make him disdainful of effort spent protecting ourselves from earthquakes. Is Seneca truly that prescient that he realized pursuit of natural science would not benefit a true Stoic? Or does he just fail to realize how incorrect he was pinpointing the causes of earthquakes? A more thorough reading of the rest of Natural Questions might resolve this series of questions.
One of the more curious things I found in the reading was this: "The reward will be to know Nature, and no prize is greater than this. The subject has numerous features which will prove useful, but the perusal of this material contains nothing more beautiful in itself than that by means of its own splendor it engages the minds of men and is cultivated, not for the sake of profit, but for the wonder it excites."
I wish I more clearly understood Seneca's meaning here. It seems to me he is saying that knowledge of this subject is valuable only in itself, not for the purpose which the knowledge serves. On the surface, this begs the question: is knowledge valuable for itself? I certainly believe it is. Knowledge is good because it is knowledge, not as a means to an end. Much like virtue is desirable only for itself. Though this does raise another issue - knowledge itself is not a virtue, and as a Stoic I recognize that virtue is the highest and most desirable possession. What place, then, does knowledge have? Is it only a means to an end, a means to achieve virtue? Delving more deeply into Seneca's statement, why is knowledge not valuable as a means to an end? Greater understanding of earthquakes has allowed modern man to minimize the danger to human life, better design buildings and possessions to withstand damage, and alter human development to avoid threat to the previous two categories. However, Seneca's particularly ambivalent attitude towards human life and possessions would make him disdainful of effort spent protecting ourselves from earthquakes. Is Seneca truly that prescient that he realized pursuit of natural science would not benefit a true Stoic? Or does he just fail to realize how incorrect he was pinpointing the causes of earthquakes? A more thorough reading of the rest of Natural Questions might resolve this series of questions.
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