On Solipsism

I faintly remember reading once upon a time that solipsism's few spokesmen included Descartes. Well, how true. In Meditations on the First Philosophy, he often speaks of a Devil who exists solely to deceive him in everything. This is the 1600s version of the brain in a vat hypothesis. I don't believe such a thought device to have any bearing on reality, but is useful in exploring epistemology and logic. Descartes wonders what he can know rationally, since of course no empirical data can be trusted. As I detailed in my last post, he extrapolates this out to proving God's existence, which he does once more along similar lines of thought in this text. I still do not agree, but I appreciate the completely inward-looking method. Curiously, though, Descartes states that the only things he can truly know is that he is and that he was. It is strange that he believes he can trust his memory, seeing as he clearly cannot trust his other senses. Perhaps he could not imagine false memories, though he does speak of dreams and the false ideas he gets from them. This is truly a topic I could get more into, perhaps I will look into that the next time I buy books (3 more came today, so it will be a while).

In his proof on God, he writes something that I found absolutely magnificent. He states that many common ideas of ours are only held as negations of other ideas. When I examined this notion, I found it quite true. When I think of infinity, I can only thing of the negation of finiteness. This seems to be a limitation of the mind. He also cites repose, which we only view as the negation of motion. I am still unsure on this, though it would seem I cannot imagine absolute calm either. A useful though experiment next time I am bored.

Proof that God exists?

Discourse on Method was quite refreshing, I enjoyed returning to the dry, straightforward writing of the older days. I was rather impressed to find that Descartes was a stoic, which subsequently led me to discovering there was a noted period of revived stoicism in the 16th and 17th centuries. I rather hope some of the philosophers of the day wrote on that subject.

In Chapter IV, Descartes proves God exists. Well, in his view he does. In the spirit of his mathematical reduction of all philosophy, indeed all natural sciences, I have broken the proof into three 'atomic propositions' (thanks, Wittgenstein!).

I am imperfect, because I doubt. This followed directly from his oft-quoted 'Cogito, ergo sum'. I find no fault here. Doubt, among other human mental activities such as sadness and disappointment, are undeniable facts of the human condition. And I do agree that they make us imperfect. It would seem that if anyone were able to quell their sadness, or do away with disappointment, they would be a better and happier person. Closer to perfection, you could say. So yes, human beings are imperfect. This does raise a troubling question, however - what does this outlook tell us about animals, or better yet, insects? For insects truly are alive. We are starting out here to prove God, so necessarily we must begin without Him - and so, humans cannot be separated from insects by the assumption of a soul. However, insects (it would seem) do not feel sadness, nor disappointment, nor doubt. Are they, then, perfect? A question for another day.

Imperfection requires that there be perfection. Not his words, but this essentially covers the second atomic proposition. I do not buy into this one. First of all, it is necessary that we define perfection. In this case it seems we are talking about happiness, essentially, though it sounds more banal that I mean it. But can a person ever be 100% happy? Can any living or thinking thing be 100% satisfied? I am not sure of it. Secondly, I do not believe imperfection implies the existence of perfection. In Descartes's argument, he knows of perfection, and since ideas cannot simply arise in his head, it must have come from something, namely in this case, the existence of God. Well, this is problematic. I do not think the mean implies the extreme - I know of good and evil, but cannot imagine a 'pure' evil. And I also do not believe that ideas cannot simply be thought up, with the necessary seeds of course. Imperfection itself is enough to spark the idea of perfection, despite the absence or presence of it.

God is the only perfect being, therefore He exists. Also a non-starter, though I'm closer to believing this one. I do not believe God is perfect. Biblical stories show us that God was persuaded in favor of or against certain actions (doubt), showed remorse for actions, and of course, expressed disappointment. How then can He be perfect?

It may be worth noting that I do believe in God, and that He is supremely good, etc. I simply disagree with the above proof.

Back to Stoicism

Well, I finished Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Frankly, I'm glad. There wasn't anything comment-worthy over the last few nights of reading, and now I can move on to bigger and better things. The editor thoughtfully included some critical reviews of Nietzsche in the back of the book - I'm comforted with how many others also agree that there are better philosophers out there. It is not that Nietzsche doesn't have good ideas, it's just that I think his presentation is ineffective.

I ordered six new books , two of which should arrive as early as tomorrow, so I can start on them after I get through Descartes, which has been waiting patiently on my nightstand. I ordered Schopenhauer's Essays, Kant's Critique of Practical Reason, Spinoza's Theologico-Political Treatise, all 4 volumes of The Discourses by Epictetus, and a commentary on stoicism. I am quite looking forward to getting back to stoicism - the commentary will perhaps be the first that I pick up.

As I continue to learn Portuguese, though already and perhaps unfortunately I am focusing more on vocabulary and grammar, I am vexed by the thought that I didn't pay Russian enough attention. Perhaps I could develop it more - but do I really have time for two languages? I am barely making progress in Portuguese. At the moment I think all I can try for is to pay a little closer attention to the Russian I expose myself to everyday. If only I had learned to listen, it would be so much easier to maintain...

On Nihilism

"Behold, you are the teacher of the eternal return, - that is now your destiny. ... Behold, we know what you teach: that all things eternally return and we ourselves with them, and that we have already existed an infinite number of times, and all things with us." - Nietzsche

Everything has been done before. My life has no inherent meaning; what I do has always been done before, even if not in my unique order and combination. What is my purpose then, my reason for being? I suppose this is nihilism. He doesn't write very positively about it either. Sartre's existentialism also teaches the lack of a priori meaning to life, but he then develops an argument for developing our own complete set of values by which to define ourselves. Nietzsche doesn't look as constructively to the problem - instead, it is a depressing resignation that we have been preceded and will be succeeded, at least in a general sense.

My confusion with him is this. It would seem that he looks upon humanity as a means to achieving the Ubermensch. If i read it correctly, the beginning of Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche wants the common man to break his back in order to develop humanity further. Contentment with the absence of pain is a poison which makes us complacent, and unwilling to continue our labors. Well, with this viewpoint, it seems to me every man does have a unique, significant meaning in achieving the Ubermensch. Even if it is true that what I do has been done before, and will be done afterwards, I can still be comforted by the fact that I played a non-trivial part in inching the progress bar towards completion, towards the Ubermensch.

But then, what happens when the higher man arrives? Does our work then stop? Does the meaning of my life hinge retroactively on the achievement of the Ubermensch? These are big questions that I feel Nietzsche does not adequately address. Granted, I have read only a small minority of his works, but I expected a more coherent version of nihilism. 

Look to the Future

"O my brothers, your nobility shall not gaze backward, but outward! You shall be exiles from all father- and forefather-lands! You shall love your children's land: let this love be your new nobility, - the undiscovered country in the remotest seas! For it I bid your sails and search!"


What should be our balance between past and future? Today's SMBC comic joked that we study history to avoid repeating our mistakes - but if we avoid our mistakes, is not the study of history then pointless in retrospect? Nietzsche now makes a related accusation, that our past is meaningless and in fact it is only our future that we should matter. After the passage above, he goes so far as to quip that we should apologize to our children for being our fathers' children. Perhaps a bit dramatic, but is there something to this?

Seems to me that Nietzsche was an existentialist. Far from being a nihilist, he certainly had values, and his Ubermensch is a lofty goal. Although he does not have a defining, a priori set of values for us, it seems clear that Nietzsche does believe in a purpose, in a unifying effort to improve our lot. How can this be nihilism then? Sartre would be proud.

And so, what is the value of our past? I agree somewhat, that the past is of little consequence, and may be a hindrance. The fact that we respect tradition and history often make a response to changing times slow. The 'old guard' isn't always right, and perhaps we should apologize for being our fathers' children. And embracing the land of our children, our future-land, would alleviate much of the overt nationalism and xenophobia that influence Nietzsche in his day. However, I would not go so far as to forget history altogether. We cannot always be in a state of flux, of changing loyalties and values. I unfortunately have nothing else definitive to say on this matter.

Moderation is but Mediocrity

"They have become small and are becoming smaller - but that is due to their doctrine of happiness and virtue. For they are modest even in virtue - because they want comfort. But only a modest virtue is compatible with comfort." - Nietzsche


Murchie's book is not strictly philosophy. Not in the airy, ethics and logic sense. But philosophy used to also include metaphysics - the study of what things are. And that is this book in a nutshell. A broad overview, at least in the first two chapters, of life on Earth in all its forms. It's the type of book I could give to a child and say 'This is all you need to know about the natural sciences.' So while it may not be modern philosophy, it is valuable.

Portuguese is going well tambem. 200 known words so far, and I'm trying to spend a greater amount of time with listening and speaking than I did with Russian. Hopefully that will help gel my understanding as well as my motivation to continue studying it. I was unsuccessful in finding a good Portuguese equivalent of RIA Novosti's twitter feed - a simple 300 post per week newsfeed. The closest I found was oGlobo, but that was about 3000 posts per week. I'll have to find a substitute.

On Redemption

That's the title of one of Zarathustra's speeches, I liked it quite a bit. Finished Part 2 tonight as well.

It was an inverse cripple, who had too little of everything, and too much of one thing.


Nietzsche is commenting on people who are 'inverse cripples', those who instead of lacking something, instead have an excess of something. He uses the grotesque example of a learned man who is, in his eyes, a giant ear supported only by a stalk - the stalk being the man and his soul. This is a rather unorthodox way of looking at those around me - if I could represent them by overabundances and shortages of something. Certainly many people have giant eyes and mouths and bellies, supported by very little. Who among us is truly balanced? We often look at a 'cripple' as if they were lacking something. The hunchback that the chapter mentions lacks a straight and normal spine. But are they any worse off than a fully healthy individual? If a person chooses to neglect their intellect and instead watches TV all day, are they not pitiable? If a person neglects his modesty, or his virtue, or his temperance; is he too any less a cripple?

Punishment is what revenge calls itself.


Also thought-provoking. The second half of the chapter revolves around this topic. We exercise our will to power to address 'it was', rather than 'it will be'. I think this is one of our greatest shortcomings. The 'it was' cannot be corrected; only the 'it will be' may be changed. Until we use our will to power for a purpose above reconciliation, I am not sure what that will to power is good for. 

New language?

I have restarted learning Portuguese on LingQ. We will see if it takes hold this time like Russian did, or falls by the wayside like Latin or Hawaiian or Korean. I probably need to get a critical mass of vocabulary, grammar, and pronunciation and then add a few Portuguese news sources to my feed to keep me honest. I could see myself understanding a good amount in a month or two, if I work at it.

I am contemplating writing a book, well, more like a short story. Modeled on The Time Machine, which I read this past Sunday. Something sweet, to the point, and that gives me adequate creative license.

I only got around to reading Nietzsche tonight. He railed against poets and, through volcanoes, great events. Both were though-provoking. I get the impression I would get a lot out of reading this book multiple times, but I simply haven't the time for that this early in my philosophical journey.

Subjective logic?

Read the last hundred or so sections of On Certainty, finishing up the book. I can't help but feel the book was off-target towards the end. Wittgenstein begins referring more frequently to subjective approaches to certainty - how other people can understand our certainty and what uncertainty means to communication. I don't consider the last sixth of the book to be nearly as well-written or powerful as, say, the middle half. Treating certainty within interpersonal communication as its own subject would require a separate book - weaving it into a discussion on personal certainty just doesn't seem appropriate.

That being said, Wittgenstein is a little hard to get through, but there's a lot to be said for his texts. I will have to reread him when I am better acquainted with logic, epistemology, metaphysics, and philosophy in general.

Thus Wrote Nietzsche

Well, I did start reading Nietzsche again. And I have to say, Thus Spoke Zarathustra is better than I expected. There is much of value in the book, and perhaps I will read more by Nietzsche after this.

The Prologue, basically just the first chapter of the book, is certainly thought-provoking. The Ubermensch (umlaut over the U) are the end-goal of humanity, it seems. Though we will never reach it. Humanity will instead become content with being content; happy with the artifical happiness of removing pain from life. I think this is true. True when Nietzsche wrote it, and even truer now. Though I did not tie the two together a priori, I read The Time Machine last night, or rather, reread. The Eloi are perfect examples of the alternative to the Ubermensch. They live with no aspirations or goals, only ambivalently as cattle for the Morloks. In a figurative sense, can many people today be said to be all that much different? As I read today, Nietzsche supports inequality and war as a method of spurring development and progress towards the Ubermensch. This is certainly unconventional, but I would say it is the only way. As H.G. Wells wrote in explaining the Eloi, humanity only adapts and progresses when confronted with something that our instincts and habits cannot overcome. If all the world were equal and provided for, equal in a philosophical sense, then I can see why the impetus for progress would vanish. 

After the Prologue, the book is written in small, two-page 'speeches' given by Zarathustra to no one in particular. I read two today that stood out. First, pity is a great cause of shame and vengefulness. Accepting kindness and giving kindness results in a sort of moral inequality, which is not rectified as easily as exchanging money or services. I am not sure pity lead to the death of God, as Nietzsche puts it, but I can agree that pity itself is destructive. The other lesson was that virtue is quite hard to identify. Not only is virtue unrewardable and unpunishable, but more importantly everyone has their own concept of it. In accordance with Nietzsche's disdain for dogma, he doesn't give a good definition of 'virtue', at least not in the Aurelian sense. I'm afraid he wouldn't much care for stoicism.

After On Certainty will come The Seven Mysteries of Life, by Guy Murchie. It's an impressively large 650ish page tome, though dust-free. It's somewhat of a hybrid of natural science and philosophy - it looks complex but also very readable and digestible. 

On Certainty 2

Almost done with Wittgenstein. Despite learning much from his book, there is one thing I think he does wrong. He repeatedly brings up the fact that saying certain simplistic logic statements (atomic facts) is nonsensical. For example, if I said 'I know that is a tree', the person to whom I said it would not get much from it. He might think I was simple, or playing around. Wittegenstein dwells on this, and I think that it has no place in a book on logic and knowledge. The use of language in order to illustrate his points is unavoidable, but I think logic and knowledge can be investigated independently of language and semantics. Just because a language statement well be better or worse received does not make it more or less true. Semantics and language are completely subjective - whereas, in my opinion, logic and knowledge are not. 

On Certainty

After slogging through On Certainty for a while, I found something that really resonated with me. He had already written 'doubt presupposes certainty', but that in itself was not enough.

What can we 'know'? Our knowledge is based on a loose foundation of assumptions, essentially. Even the most unshakeable pieces of knowledge, such as how many fingers I have, are essentially just concretely held assumptions. I can imagine a situation in which people contrived to convince me otherwise - that I had 4 or 6 fingers, perhaps. If they put sufficient effort into their endeavor, they could very well succeed. But if I then doubted the number of fingers I have, then how could I have been said to 'know' that number in the first place? To know is to be infallible, at least philosophically, but clearly then there is not much, if anything at all, that we can know.

I think this is pretty important. We 'know', for instance, that solids do not just disappear. However, is it not technically possible? There is a probability that a given atom will interact with anti-matter or simply release itself from its bonds or any number of other things. On the order of the number of atoms that comprise a macroscopic object, these probabilities fall to zero. Well, almost. There is still a nonzero chance that a tree, for example, could simply vaporize. Empirically, we know this does not practicably happen. So we say, we 'know' it cannot happen. But this is a fallacy.

Logic and knowledge are concepts that I am interested in reading more about. After Wittgenstein perhaps I will try Russell or Moore. 

Stoicism

Just finished Meditations, by Marcus Aurelius. It has once again piqued my interest in stoicism. Of course Epictetus' Enchiridion was a little more straightforward, but Aurelius has some interesting takes on the old philosophy and certainly brings something to the table. I don't quite know where to look for more stoic literature, though I don't think it will be too hard to find.

I'm having a bit of trouble trying to apply stoicism to everyday life anyway. I still find myself being angered by the actions of my roommates, mostly. This of course means I need more study and reflection.

I am close to finishing Wittgenstein. I had to cut short reading the Tractatus, as I simply couldn't digest it. Wittgenstein writes about ontology, epistemology, and logic. A little above my grade level, but I'm learning rapidly. His blue book was good, brown book was better, and On Certainty is best. His arguments are giving me a background in epistemology, and I am interested in pursuing that branch of philosophy further.

Thus Spoke Zarathustra by Nietzsche is on deck. I swore I wouldn't read him again, but a knowledgeable classmate of mine thought I would like it. I'll read it on faith.

Interesting tidbit of the day: from a commentary on Aurelius by George Long, politics are merely an extension of ethics. They are both the study of correct living, one for the many and the other for the one. I liked this viewpoint.