A priori, synthetic knowledge?

I have finished Kant's Introduction to Logic and just started Kant's Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics. Well, by started I mean I am almost finished with the introduction. Haven't actually tapped any wisdom yet, but that'll come. I'm still ahead of my resolution, so that's good. 1 book, 0 weeks elapsed.

I am starting to become better acquainted with the terminology and discourse of metaphysics and epistemology. I have some hope for Kant, but not a whole lot. I like some of his formal logic theory but I disagree with his opinions on a priori knowledge and synthetic judgments in general. I should preface this by saying that I have not read much on the subject, and my views are of course still uninformed. With that being said, I find that I'm not sure a priori knowledge is even possible. A priori synthetic judgments are definitely impossible, as all synthetic judgments require experience, and even analytic judgments require knowledge of structure and language to define thought. It would be interesting to read what psychology has to say on the issue of what the blank human mind is capable of. Until then, I may just be a staunch empiricist. This would require a more careful reading of Locke and Hume, and perhaps to be fair I will read Leibniz as well. In any case, Kant has four books to argue his case for the middle ground between rationalism and empiricism.

On Certainty 3

I finished Kant's Introduction to Logic tonight, though I won't have finished the book until I finish the essay on formal logic at the end. The book itself was only a posthumous compendium of his lecture notes; I suppose 'what makes a book' is a valid question. Anyway, I was intrigued by his discussion of the three levels of certainty, so to speak.

Opinion is objectively and subjectively inadequate, belief is objectively inadequate but subjectively adequate, and knowledge is both objectively and subjectively adequate. I don't precisely know what Kant means by 'adequate', though I think I understand his meaning. What I disagree with can be quickly summarized by the following quote: "Philosophical truths, however, which are rational, cannot be matters of belief at all; they must simply be known; for philosophy does not admit of any mere persuasion." The bigger issue here might be that I am still unsold on anything being known a priori. If such knowledge is possible, I am not sure it would extend beyond mathematics - I do not know how it could extend to philosophy. As Kant surely knows, what the ancient philosophers expounded was philosophy as well, but they contradicted each other - surely not everyone can be right. Hence, objective inadequacy of (some) philosophy. If he means to say that true philosophy can only be reasoned, and that not all 'philosophy' is really philosophy, then he should be a bit more clear on his definitions.

Towards the end of the book he discusses prejudices, which I find quite truthful and poignant. His main three prejudices of authority are ones I find myself guilty of in varying degrees. The prejudice of personal authority - I do sometimes place too much stock in what others have said or written, at the expense of exercising my own reason. This is a good thing to work on in my philosophical pursuits. The prejudice of the authority of the majority - I must not take others' word on philosophy, but must read it for myself to discover what is correct and what is not. Though starting with better-received philosophers may not be the worst course of action. Finally, the prejudice of authority of the age. Kant speaks of deference to ancient wisdom, despite the retarded state of development of intellect in those days. Well, I disagree with the sweeping generalization that ancients were any less intelligent or well informed on philosophical matters. Indeed, I consider those days a much better time for philosophizing, without the distractions of today. However, I find within myself a prejudice towards favoring the views of the ancients, which I should fight in order to remain impartial.

The Importance of Connecting Knowledge

All departments of knowledge stand in a certain natural relation to one another. Now if in endeavoring to enlarge our knowledge we neglect this natural connection, all our manifold knowledge will result in nothing but mere rhapsody. But if we make some one science our end, and consider all other parts of knowledge only as means to it, then we impart to our knowledge a certain systematic character. - Chapter Six, Introduction to Logic


I am a firm believer of the importance of the connections between knowledge. Much like the way that, ideally, all pages on Wikipedia (hence, topics) are connected fluidly. It is difficult to truly estimate the staggering quantity of information that can be accessed in this way. For example, in the book on North Korea I'm reading now, sometimes they mention steel or cement production. Whole books have surely been written on steel production, or cement formulae. And from there, one could progress further back to chemistry, or could turn and learn about building applications. I suppose I treat my knowledge base much like a road atlas. Of course it is important to fill in specific areas, analogous to cities, with every side street and feature. It is impossible to know every road in the nation - but what good would an atlas be if the various cities weren't connected? Improving the strength of the connections between my individual areas of knowledge is important.

Yet, I do not agree with the last sentence of Kant's words, replicated above. What good would it do to focus solely on one science, even if we learn other sciences as a 'means to that end'. All knowledge is important. And it would presumptuous to assume that I can identify which area of knowledge is most important and deserving of my attention. Only someone who knew the full extent and utility of every piece of information could make that determination. I think I realize Kant's intention here, but I see a fundamental incongruity within it. To make an accurate and truthful judgement about something requires knowledge about it. I can only hope that a continued devotion to learning and philosophy will reveal that which is truly most important.

Emotion and Kant

I was thinking the other day as I was driving about the role of emotion in our lives. The Stoic party line is essentially that emotions are a manifestation of incorrect reason, of irrational thinking. I think that it many cases this is true. Anger, jealousy, disappointment, fear - these all arise from a non-Stoic view of the situation. The mythical Stoic sage surely would not have emotions, but would rather only reason calmly. But emotion does have its uses, and it is here I diverge from Stoic dogma. First of all, God has emotion. At various times in Biblical literature he is angry and at other times he is sympathetic, able to be swayed from his decisions. The original Stoics worshipped the Pantheon of Greek gods and goddesses - surely they too showed emotion. And how can gods be less than perfect? On a more modern note, my second objection is that emotion helps us learn. A strong emotional reaction imprints deeply upon us - a strong feeling of anger, if we are penitent for it, makes us less likely to be angry under the same conditions a second time. What does modern psychology say about completely non-emotional people, assuming such a person exists? Yet while I challenge the theoretical basis that emotion can and should be eradicated, I do subscribe to the theory that emotion should be opposed and minimized, while recognizing it for what it is and how it can help develop us.

I just began reading Kant. I started with an overview of his works, Kant's Introduction to Logic. The first three chapters have been on logic, on what can be known, and on the definition and structure of knowledge. I was interested in reading that mathematics and philosophy are the only rational sciences, all others are empirical. I suppose this means that only mathematics and philosophy can be positively known. Though, I am not sure philosophy is true a priori knowledge. How can it be? How can the study of correct living be known before living? They say mathematics is the only pure science, uncorrupted by observational error and biases and such. I wonder why reason, the basic rules of logic, are not also included in this category. I would hesitate to put them in the a priori category of knowledge, but surely the rules can be positively known.

My New Year's resolution is to read one philosophy book per week. Let's hope I can stick to it.