I finished Kant's Introduction to Logic tonight, though I won't have finished the book until I finish the essay on formal logic at the end. The book itself was only a posthumous compendium of his lecture notes; I suppose 'what makes a book' is a valid question. Anyway, I was intrigued by his discussion of the three levels of certainty, so to speak.
Opinion is objectively and subjectively inadequate, belief is objectively inadequate but subjectively adequate, and knowledge is both objectively and subjectively adequate. I don't precisely know what Kant means by 'adequate', though I think I understand his meaning. What I disagree with can be quickly summarized by the following quote: "Philosophical truths, however, which are rational, cannot be matters of belief at all; they must simply be known; for philosophy does not admit of any mere persuasion." The bigger issue here might be that I am still unsold on anything being known a priori. If such knowledge is possible, I am not sure it would extend beyond mathematics - I do not know how it could extend to philosophy. As Kant surely knows, what the ancient philosophers expounded was philosophy as well, but they contradicted each other - surely not everyone can be right. Hence, objective inadequacy of (some) philosophy. If he means to say that true philosophy can only be reasoned, and that not all 'philosophy' is really philosophy, then he should be a bit more clear on his definitions.
Towards the end of the book he discusses prejudices, which I find quite truthful and poignant. His main three prejudices of authority are ones I find myself guilty of in varying degrees. The prejudice of personal authority - I do sometimes place too much stock in what others have said or written, at the expense of exercising my own reason. This is a good thing to work on in my philosophical pursuits. The prejudice of the authority of the majority - I must not take others' word on philosophy, but must read it for myself to discover what is correct and what is not. Though starting with better-received philosophers may not be the worst course of action. Finally, the prejudice of authority of the age. Kant speaks of deference to ancient wisdom, despite the retarded state of development of intellect in those days. Well, I disagree with the sweeping generalization that ancients were any less intelligent or well informed on philosophical matters. Indeed, I consider those days a much better time for philosophizing, without the distractions of today. However, I find within myself a prejudice towards favoring the views of the ancients, which I should fight in order to remain impartial.
Opinion is objectively and subjectively inadequate, belief is objectively inadequate but subjectively adequate, and knowledge is both objectively and subjectively adequate. I don't precisely know what Kant means by 'adequate', though I think I understand his meaning. What I disagree with can be quickly summarized by the following quote: "Philosophical truths, however, which are rational, cannot be matters of belief at all; they must simply be known; for philosophy does not admit of any mere persuasion." The bigger issue here might be that I am still unsold on anything being known a priori. If such knowledge is possible, I am not sure it would extend beyond mathematics - I do not know how it could extend to philosophy. As Kant surely knows, what the ancient philosophers expounded was philosophy as well, but they contradicted each other - surely not everyone can be right. Hence, objective inadequacy of (some) philosophy. If he means to say that true philosophy can only be reasoned, and that not all 'philosophy' is really philosophy, then he should be a bit more clear on his definitions.
Towards the end of the book he discusses prejudices, which I find quite truthful and poignant. His main three prejudices of authority are ones I find myself guilty of in varying degrees. The prejudice of personal authority - I do sometimes place too much stock in what others have said or written, at the expense of exercising my own reason. This is a good thing to work on in my philosophical pursuits. The prejudice of the authority of the majority - I must not take others' word on philosophy, but must read it for myself to discover what is correct and what is not. Though starting with better-received philosophers may not be the worst course of action. Finally, the prejudice of authority of the age. Kant speaks of deference to ancient wisdom, despite the retarded state of development of intellect in those days. Well, I disagree with the sweeping generalization that ancients were any less intelligent or well informed on philosophical matters. Indeed, I consider those days a much better time for philosophizing, without the distractions of today. However, I find within myself a prejudice towards favoring the views of the ancients, which I should fight in order to remain impartial.
No comments:
Post a Comment