And so we arrive at the end of Stoic ontology. The third and fourth genera - disposed and relatively disposed. Perhaps I have a flawed understanding, which itself is understandable considering the dearth of extant texts, but to me these seem to indicate qualities of a substance. Not necessarily an identity, as that is what qualified is, but rather characteristics. Disposed substance has intrinsic characteristics, like weight and density. Relatively disposed substance has characteristics which can change as a result of changes external to that substance. The oft-cited Greek example is that of two men standing together, the 'man on the right' loses that characteristic if his neighbor moves, despite the fact that the first man did nothing.
Stoics seemed to have put most characteristics, however, in the second and third genera. They acknowledged that properties like sweetness and bitterness were experienced differently among people, yet still maintained they were dispositions and not relative. I disagree, and it is comforting to know Carneades did as well. In the Greek skepticism vein (NOT the modern skepticism), I would say there are very few qualities that can be said to be 'intrinsic', beyond of course mass and density. And any quality that is not intrinsic, cannot be said to identify someone - therefore, the vast majority of transitive characteristics can only be placed in the fourth genus. Chrysippus and Aristo once argued about where virtue and knowledge were to be placed. That is a question to ponder, to be sure.
Finally, we arrive at universals. The Stoics had a much more sensible view than Plato did on the subject. Thinking of a universal idea such as 'man' produces a conception in our mind of what 'man' is - the concept that results is the universal 'man'. Hence, such a concept is transitory, non-existent, and perhaps most importantly, subjective. A universal does not predate any specific example of it, as Platonic universals do, and for that matter is not really bound to a specific example at all. The trouble with this argument is when individuals confuse their universals - what if when one person thought of 'man', another thought of 'horse'. When discourse is subjective in this manner, philosophy is no easy task.
Stoics seemed to have put most characteristics, however, in the second and third genera. They acknowledged that properties like sweetness and bitterness were experienced differently among people, yet still maintained they were dispositions and not relative. I disagree, and it is comforting to know Carneades did as well. In the Greek skepticism vein (NOT the modern skepticism), I would say there are very few qualities that can be said to be 'intrinsic', beyond of course mass and density. And any quality that is not intrinsic, cannot be said to identify someone - therefore, the vast majority of transitive characteristics can only be placed in the fourth genus. Chrysippus and Aristo once argued about where virtue and knowledge were to be placed. That is a question to ponder, to be sure.
Finally, we arrive at universals. The Stoics had a much more sensible view than Plato did on the subject. Thinking of a universal idea such as 'man' produces a conception in our mind of what 'man' is - the concept that results is the universal 'man'. Hence, such a concept is transitory, non-existent, and perhaps most importantly, subjective. A universal does not predate any specific example of it, as Platonic universals do, and for that matter is not really bound to a specific example at all. The trouble with this argument is when individuals confuse their universals - what if when one person thought of 'man', another thought of 'horse'. When discourse is subjective in this manner, philosophy is no easy task.
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