Showing posts with label Mill. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Mill. Show all posts

Saturday, February 4, 2012

Bentham and Utilitarianism 2

In Chapter Two, Bentham states that the only two groups that oppose the principle of utility are the religionists and the philosophers. By religionists he, I assume, mainly signifies observant Christians, though any religious person would fall under this label. Devout people put service to a deity above bodily pleasure, and hence do not subscribe to Bentham's dichotomous principle of utility. The philosophers that Bentham opposes are the 'ascetics', under which he claims fall the Stoics.

Well, this is another fault of Bentham's limited principle of utility. Stoics pursue virtue, not pleasure. By simply redrawing the lines of the principle of the utility, Stoics are as utilitarian as can be. Well, maybe not as mathematical in their reasoning, but it fits the general mold. This goes the show my early argument, in the last post, that the principle of utility devolves into a tautology if Bentham allows it to encompass any possible criticism. If criticisms are allowed, well then, the principle is wrong. Surely as it is written by him, and also as is written by J.S. Mill. Some things, as Christians and Stoics believe, can not be boiled down to fit a mathematical argument.

This is a perplexing discrepancy in Bentham's reasoning. Modern American and, even moreso, Western European societies are all but secular. A modern moralist could be forgiven for ignoring the influence of religion on the decisions made by individuals, at least on the macro scale. But in Victorian England, or even before, at the time of the American Revolution, religion was as important as ever. I cannot fathom how Bentham could have dared to assume British subjects so secular as to adopt his principle of utilitarian calculus, based on pleasure and pain.

Bentham and Utilitarianism 1

After a short hiatus, philosophical reflections are back. Though they will be interrupted again soon as I travel to Nicaragua on vacation.

I have begun reading An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation by Jeremy Bentham. I just finished Mill's On Liberty, so I suppose this is necessary required reading. The first question arises in the introduction, not even written by Bentham. Bentham is summarized as arguing that all humans live to maximize pleasure and minimize pain. Well, I object, though perhaps only on the ground of semantics. To be honest, I don't yet know what Bentham truly means by this. If he means that humans want only pleasure in the modern sense of the word, and do not care for the greater part of what forms eudaimonia, then of course I object. Ask any parent - who would willingly take on so much grief and pain and toil if it were not for a much greater, higher happiness. A happiness that I'm not sure you can call pleasure, but that is certainly desirable. I hope this is not what Bentham truly intends to say, and that it is just a foible on the part of the introduction's author.

The preface is written in the third person, but rather awkwardly and with the constant knowledge that the subject is also the other. This makes the preface fairly annoying to read, constantly jolting the reader from his rhythm to confusion. Still more readable than Hobbes though.

Chapter One kicks off with a few definitions. Sadly, Bentham does restrict his principle of utility to pure pleasure and pain, as I objected to above. It seems he added to his principle in an endnote after the work was written to align his utilitarianism more with what would become John Stuart Mill's utilitarianism - taking into account virtue, future benefit, and self-fulfillment. I am not sure, however, it will be as easy as adding endnotes to reconcile the rest of his work with this new viewpoint. My beliefs, of course, do not agree with Bentham's primitive view of utility. Maximizing good, or pleasure, is only good in the sense that we do everything we can to pamper our pets. Most people require governments to protect their pursuit of liberty and happiness so they can lead uncomplicated lives and make incremental progress towards the Ubermensch. But ask Marcus Aurelius or Seneca, and he will tell you that virtue does require a just bed to sleep in.

The second disagreeable portion of Bentham first chapter is his preemptive defense against any argument. He claims that any criticism of his principle of utility merely alters the original parameters - what is right and what is not - but does not address the form of the argument. I think this ends up making his argument pedantic and redundant. He posits that the action which brings about the greatest amount of happiness to the greatest amount of people is the right action. If he qualifies that view, with protections for the minority or restricting certain actions, then his argument becomes no better than 'the action which is right, is the right action'. I was dismayed to see this nonsensical argument appear towards the end of the chapter.

Sunday, July 31, 2011

Utility


Finished Utilitarianism this morning, I found it a very agreeable take on things and I support Mill's disinterested view of the merit of happiness. His morality is very much subjective, and I like that; perhaps it is even a little too subjective. To begin with, he concludes that happiness is the end of man (end meaning goal) and everything else is but a means to that end. I think this is useful so far as it pertains to the temporal state of man, but when religion is taken into account then happiness is not the true aim anymore. Mill tries to get around this by saying a benevolent God would wish his creatures to be happy, but I'm not sure this is really true. Certainly, happiness is a positive quality in humanity, but virtue must also have a place. For example, perhaps everyone could be made more happy (total happiness increases) if religion were abolished, and hence religiously-inspired strife also ended. But I don't think many people would see this as a good at all. Later in the book, Mill discusses justice, and rights. I have yet to understand his take on how the two meet - what if total happiness could be increased by the seizure of a few rights?

There's an interesting comparison of virtue to money, in terms of their utility. Money is a means to an end, a means to fulfill our pleasures and desires. However, money is often seen as an end in itself; but this is not entirely a bad thing. If money is a source of happiness, instead of a means to it, then the ultimate end of happiness is still achievable, and perhaps moreso. Virtue can be seen in this light. Disregarding the religious ramifications of virtue, it is a means to an end, to achieving a society in spite of our Hobbesian tendencies. However, it has become to many people an end in itself - which if it produces happiness, is all the better. Which brings me to...

The morality of utilitarianism does not distinguish among motives. A man who saves a drowning man altruistically is no different, morally, than the man does that expecting a reward. Intention does matter, so a man who saves a drowning man only to inflict pain on him later is still immoral. But unlike Kantian ethics, actions are evaluated purely on their consequences - this jibes well with Nietzsche.

Finally, my favorite quote. "It is better to be a man dissatisfied than a pig satisfied." Pleasures of the mind are greater than pleasures of the body. I found a similar tenet in the Enchiridion. Bentham believed that all pleasure was equal, which sounds like hedonism. But Mill's utilitarianism does differentiate.

In other news, listened to a podcast on the history of the Roman empire today. This should be useful since so many classical writers refer to Roman figures. And I've been reading much about the Incan empire lately. I was very surprised to learn that the empire only lasted for about 100 years, from 1438 to about 1533. Surprising how advanced they were in some areas and how deficient in others - learning about them at the same time as reading Guns, Germs, and Steel helps shed perspective on those deficiencies as well.